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EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT IN
A RAPIDLY CHANGING REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT:
A CONVERSATION FROM THE CLEARING HOUSE
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
I. INTRODUCTION

On November 22, 2013, the Center for Banking and Finance at
the University of North Carolina School of Law hosted a dialog on
compliance risk management in a changing regulatory environment at
The Clearing House's 2013 Annual Conference.' The Clearing House
also provided generous financial support for this discussion.
Biographical information about the moderators and the panelists is set
forth before the transcript of the dialog begins.

Moderators
Lissa Broome is the Wells Fargo Professor of Banking at the
University of North Carolina School of Law and also the Director of the
school's Center for Banking and Finance.
Richard Neiman is the Vice Chairman of the Global Financial
Services Regulatory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and the
former New York Superintendent of Banks from 2007 to 2011.
Panelists
Sally Belshaw is the Deputy Comptroller for Large Banks at the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and she formerly
served as Examiner-in-Charge at major national banks including
1. The Clearing House is the oldest banking association and payments company in the
United States, having been established in 1853. It is owned by the world's largest
commercial banks. The Clearing House Payments Company L.L.C. provides payment,
clearing, and settlement services to its member banks and other financial institutions,
clearing almost $2 trillion daily and representing nearly half of the automatedclearinghouse, funds-transfer, and check-image payments made in the U.S. The Clearing
House L.L.C. is a nonpartisan advocacy organization representing the interests of its owner
banks on a variety of its important banking issues.
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HSBC's national banks, Bank One, and Huntington National Bank.
Tim Clark is a Senior Associate Director for the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; he is in the Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation and his responsibilities include the
Federal Reserve's supervisory stress testing program.
Paula Dominick is the head of Global Compliance at Bank of
America and prior to joining that firm she spent eighteen years at
Goldman Sachs which included serving as head of Global Credit
Research and Market Strategy.
Carol Hunley is an Executive Vice President and the Chief
Compliance Officer at Santander Bank N.A., a subsidiary of Santander
and she has over thirty years of banking experience.
Steve Kaplan is the Northeast Regional Director for the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and he is the former
Pennsylvania Secretary of Banking.
II. SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT

Broome: How will regulators bring change and influence
policy, through supervision or enforcement? What is the dynamic
between the bank and the examiner?
Belshaw: First of all thanks to all of you for including me
today. It is indeed an honor and I think it is important that we continue
this kind of dialog. For 150 years the OCC has been a prudential
supervisor and we have always used our supervision and suasion to
implement policy and affect change in our banks. In large bank
supervision, we took stock after the financial crisis and asked ourselves:
What have we learned? What should we have done differently? What
must we do differently going forward?
In addition to building financial strength in terms of capital and
liquidity, we clarified via our heightened expectations the need for
strong governance - strong audit and risk management functions.
Compliance risk management is a key element of the risk management
process. It is your compliance risk management people, processes, and
results that really are what every single executive officer in your
companies, every board member wants. Building a strong compliance
process in a company of hundreds of thousands of people is a challenge
- you will hear that described by some of the practitioners here today.
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We are an agency of examiners who engage with our banks in
much the same way that we always have. The dynamic between
examiners and our banks, we hope, is always characterized by mutual,
professional respect. Our examiners ask questions, understand the
processes, and trust but verify. We spend a great deal of time doing
that.
At the OCC our attorneys work for our examiners. The
enforcement attorneys deal with the issues that we uncover and bring to
them. When we have to go the enforcement route, which is only for the
most serious matters, it is only when the supervisory suasion and the
regular process that I talked about has not been effective.
Now, there may be a sense that this dynamic is changing. In a
couple of instances I would agree that we have behaved a bit differently
of late, especially where consumers are concerned. Foreclosure orders
are an example; that process was not one where we discovered a
problem and gave a good opportunity to correct it. We went pretty
hard, pretty fast into an enforcement process. Situations where UDAP
(Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices) concerns have come up, have
been similar.
As bankers, you may feel on occasion that you did not get the
opportunity to fix a newly-discovered problem, that you did not get that
first bite at the apple. That has been the case at times, but that is not our
goal. Supervision is our mission and we really only want to go to
enforcement as a last resort.
At a recent meeting of our outside independent directors, I told
them that self-identification is always the best approach. Being open
with us when you find issues is critical. Even if an enforcement action
ensues, the bank's openness will always be considered as a mitigating
factor in our response.
Clark: Sally Belshaw makes a lot of really good points. My
starting place is that enforcement comes when policies and supervision
have not been effective at achieving the behaviors that we want. The
supervision process tends to have quite a large role in the interpretation
and implementation of policy - it is a natural relationship between the
two.
With respect to the compliance and supervision from the Federal
Reserve, we established a new framework in 2012 for our supervision
program for the largest firms. It is largely focused on a few areas:
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resiliency, in terms of capital and liquidity under stress; recovery and
resolution planning; and corporate governance.
Within the corporate governance side of things, a large
emphasis is on the board of directors and senior management. They
need to put in place effective processes and the right culture to actually
allow for strong, effective compliance functions and other independent
internal controls. These should be functions that have the ability to
influence decision making at the firm and actually, hopefully get us to a
position where these internal controls and our oversight can forestall the
need for enforcement actions.
Kaplan: As a third regulator on the panel, there is a nuance, a
difference, in the way the CFPB thinks about these issues. We think of
supervision and enforcement as two different tools in our toolkit to
accomplish our mission which is the protection of consumers. There
are different circumstances where deploying one of those tools is going
to be more appropriate.
I think we do have a preference for supervision as the others
have expressed, but by its very nature, supervision tends to be a private
matter between the regulator and the institution. There are times when
the interests of consumers are better served by making consumers and
the world aware of an area of concern. In those instances, we consider it
to be more appropriate to use an enforcement tool and go public with
the issue. Generally speaking, as Sally mentioned, this is limited to
more serious matters - the matters where we think there is a need to
inform the nation as a whole all at once, rather than going institution by
institution.
Broome: Are there differences between an OCC exam and a
CFPB exam?
Kaplan: I think there are. Initially, I suggest that there might
not seem to be quite a lot of difference. I think the feel of an exam from
the CFPB and the feel of an exam from the OCC or one of the other
prudential regulators is similar. We issue information requests. We
send teams on site. The team reviews documentation. They do
analysis. They talk to staff at the institutions we are examining. In
those ways I think we are all quite similar.
But in other ways the CFPB is different. We are different in
part because our mission is a different mission. We do not have a safety
and soundness mandate, so our primary concern is not for the
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institution. We are in business to look after the interests of consumers
in the marketplace.
For that reason we do not have as much of a need or incentive to
look at a single institution soup to nuts in one fell swoop the way the
traditional prudential regulators would. Prudential regulators have to
decide where an institution is on a scale between very, very sound and
in jeopardy of failure. We are more interested in looking at the world
from the consumer's perspective. That means looking at products that
represent a risk to consumers at any given moment in history.
Relevant to the folks on the panel, it is important that we look
not just at depository institutions, but also at a vast array of nondepository institutions. By so doing we seek to create a level playing
field in which all purveyors of financial products to consumers can feel
secure that someone else is not out there eating their lunch by skirting
the rules. We think that prior to the creation of the CFPB that was
happening all too often. Financial institutions that take deposits - banks
and credit unions - were often suffering from what they objectively
perceived as unfair competition from the shadow banking sector and
less regulated organizations. We differ in who we regulate and we differ
in our focus on individual product lines rather than a full exam at any
given moment.
III. REGULATORY CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Neiman: Let's talk now about regulatory change management.
I think we will all agree that there has never been a time in our recent
history when there has been a greater confluence of so many regulations
and laws, both domestically and internationally, being proposed and
implemented all at the same time. It is across business units. It is
across every internal control function. It impacts banking and nonbanking subsidiaries. It impacts corporate, capital markets, retail across the board.
During the early response to the Dodd-Frank proposals three
years ago, the process was driven by legal and compliance. It was
reactive to the proposals and to the final rules. It was tactical, meaning
it was focused on meeting the compliance dates.
What we have seen is a real shift, particularly among the global
institutions like Bank of America and Santander, which are sitting here
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with us. It is now much more global in perspective. It is much more
business ownership than legal and compliance. It is much more
proactive than reactive. I guess most importantly, it is more strategic
than tactical, meaning that it is accessing the impact both of proposed
and final rules on the institution's business model, its product offerings,
and which geographies it should be active in.
You just have to look at areas around subsidiarization to see the
enormous impact that these global rules, particularly those including
resolution and too big to fail, will have on fundamental business
models. The rules impact whether an institution can actually operate
through global branches or is forced to operate through subsidiarization.
So I think we are both asking Carol Hunley and Paula Dominick to
comment on, from Bank of America and then Santander, how you are
managing this regulatory change.
Dominick: I think it is important to understand that the best
compliance risk culture has to be owned by the businesses. This shift in
the new rules that we were just talking about is actually very healthy.
The regulatory shift should be anticipatory around rules that have not
yet been written, but that we expect to be written, that we expect to be
integrated into business processes.
Having the board of directors actually challenge and discuss and
debate with regulatory rules in mind is beneficial for the institutions.
We are building in a challenge function across all of the risk and control
functions on the strategic plan before it even gets to the board. This
means there is a healthy dialog with the business leaders on the
compliance implications for potential expansion or contraction. This
also forces us to address shifts in risk including credit risk and market
risk. This is a healthy evolution of regulation change management, it is
not that tactical piece that you talked about.
Neiman: And how does regulation change management relate
to the compliance function? Are they related or are they separate?
Dominick: They are related. We call it the virtuous circle.
Regulation change management is integral to the compliance program
because as your rules change, as your perspective around the rules
changes, those rules have to carry through every piece of your
compliance management system. There is a whole machine now that is
part of compliance that six or seven years ago did not look like this.
Previously, compliance was more about advice and counsel.
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Any shift in a rule has to flow through the entire machine. For
example, a shift in a mortgage servicing rule has to flow through the
whole mortgage origination machine; it is integrally connected into the
compliance process. I do not think you can pull them apart.
Neiman: Carol, you are with one of the largest Spanish banks.
You have a large global footprint; you have large commercial and retail
operations here in the U.S. You have to deal with Spanish rules and
U.S. rules. How do you manage this regulatory change globally?
Hunley: I manage the regulatory change here in the U.S. and I
try to influence the way our parent thinks about compliance in Spain
and globally. I think they are very receptive because they recognize that
the U.S. regulatory expectations are generally going to be the standard.
If you can meet that standard-and I am not sure we can check that box
yet-but if you meet that standard you are generally in good stead
globally. Our parent company has been extremely supportive of the
compliance program here in the U.S.
Paula Dominick is right about the process for implementing
specific rules; we have had a lot of different rules come down. I look
back to 2009 when I presented to a board at a prior institution - it was
the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Red Flags implementation. I told
the board there was good news and bad news: the good news is I think
we did this very, very well; the bad news is I do not think we could
implement two of these rules at one time. Implementing just the one
rule was a very significant project, but now we are doing dozens of
these Dodd-Frank rules at one time. It has been a paradigm shift in
project management, in ownership, and in accountability. Frankly, the
businesses that Paula talks about are a little shell shocked in terms of
really accepting ownership for that compliance.
But, then there is also the heightened expectations that Sally
Belshaw talked about. We are a recent addition to the OCC large bank
program; we transitioned from a thrift two years ago. We had a lot of
ground to cover in a couple of years and the heightened expectations is
not necessarily about rules and legislation. Rather, it is a question of
what a strong compliance, audit, and risk management framework looks
like. I think we are all participating in a conversation about that, about
how you put that in place. I think it is a great conversation, but one that
I am not sure has reached the same point as the regulatory change
process.
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For example, look at the vendor management guidance that
came out last week. Our organization has already discussed the
guidance a great deal, but the changes permeate every facet of the
organization. This shows us that regulation change management is not
just about your strategic plans and challenging those strategic plans.
You have to ask do those plans involve a third party? What resources
are you going to bring to bear against that strategic plan, what
compliance resources, what business resources? It is a real paradigm
shift.
Neiman: Tim, Sally, how are the global banks doing in this
area? Have you seen some of the best practices? Is there anything you
can share with us? Could you give them a grade in managing this
regulatory complexity that is sweeping the world?
Clark: I think that it is premature to comment on best practices.
Obviously, there is a tremendous amount of complexity. There has
been a lot of change around the world - jurisdictional challenges. What
we have seen is that those responsible for guiding these organizations
are taking this seriously. It has captured their attention in ways that it
did not in the past. Perhaps that is because we have made the new rules
so complicated and made compliance so difficult that there is no choice
but for the heads of these institutions to become personally involved.
So in terms of best practices, I would not want to go there, but have we
seen movement in the right direction? Are we feeling that this is getting
the right level of attention? I think we are moving in the right direction.
That is a good thing and there is a lot of work still to do, but we
understand how complicated it is.
Belshaw: I absolutely agree with that; it continues to be a work
in progress. I feel like we have largely made it in terms of the financial
strength enhancements. In many respects, I think that is easier than
these more intangible shifts, changes in processes within your
institution. What we look for is a commitment to reaching full
compliance; we want to see appropriate plans. We evaluate if an
institution is on track - that is what we are measuring and monitoring.
With some compliance issues it is not a simple matter of making
a mistake. If you build a system that makes a mistake, then you are
repeating that mistake millions of times. That is one of the keys that
you have to test. As Paula said, you test your systems all the time to
make sure you are not creating a big problem for yourself.
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Clark: As an example, think of doing information technology
once if you are going to do it for FATCA (Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act) and you are going to do it for AML (Anti-Money
Laundering), you want to look at it across the board, what are those
changes, so you are not dealing with a siloed situation.
Kaplan: That is exactly right. It is heartening to hear my
colleagues from the two big institutions talking about building the
fundamental machine that will accommodate this need to respond to so
many issues at once. We spent a fair chunk of our first year of our
existence doing CMS (Compliance Management System) reviews. We
have drilled down and for us CMS is policies and procedures, it is
training, it is monitoring and remediation, and management and board
oversight - there are subcategories under each of those.
Without those fundamental systems in place, there is no
capacity for an institution to respond to all the challenges that come up
today. But if an organization has those pieces in place initially, then
their capacity to respond is very strong. We worry a lot about CMS and
I know that the large banks that we regulate do as well.
Dominick: The change management system is the foundation; it
is exactly as Steve Kaplan said. If you do not have a well-designed
foundation to accommodate change, there will always be things you can
plan, but you cannot predict everything. The volume of change that
Carol Hunley talked about and the foundation that Steve talked about,
those are the starting point of any compliance management system.
You have to be able to accept the volume of rule changes; there has to
be a process by which to work through all these items. If you do not
start with that foundation, with these building blocks, then when
something happens that you have not planned for, you are not able to
cope.
Every rule is like a pebble in a pond. Every rule is that little,
little pebble in a pond that sends ripples across the organization. All
those ripples travel across the organization; they morph and morph and
morph in ways that are difficult to predict. Unless you can take each
new rule through each system to the end, you will not know how that
rule will affect the whole organization.
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IV. REPUTATIONAL RISK

Broome: Let us move on to reputational risk. The first
perspective I would like to get on this is how the compliance officers,
Carol Hunley and Paula Dominick, mitigate reputational risk. How do
you think about mitigating reputational risk and what actions do you
take to that end?
Hunley: My personal opinion is that reputational risk has kind
of morphed over time. Due to the recent volume of enforcement
actions, I am not sure that a regulatory fine necessarily has the same
reputational impact that it once had.
At our institution the conversation is first and foremost about
culture. That is the foundation. You have to have a strong compliance
and risk culture in the organization to be focused on things that can
create reputational risk. As compliance officer, I am engaged in those
conversations with our management and the board.
Additionally, it seems that reputational risk has become more
granular, possibly because the CFPB has come onboard. We are
starting to look at what are our customers saying to each other on social
media. We are focusing more on customer and consumer feedback. So
I think that the definition of reputational risk has changed.
The good news is we are talking about it; we are talking more
about culture today than ever before. We are talking about it not only at
the management level, but at the board level. The board is very
interested in these topics; we know we have their attention and we know
they are engaged in these conversations.
Dominick: You can see the way reputational risk has changed
over the last six years. Originally, institutions tended to do a pretty
good job of managing transactional reputational risk and underwriting
reputational risk. We all had machines that worked very well around
underwriting specific deals in the wealth management system, and
product design. Where we have grown and changed is exactly as Carol
Hunley said; the dialog has escalated much higher in the organization.
The other change we are seeing is that conversations about
reputational risk are now based upon principles rather than rules. I take
that as a sign that this culture is starting to change and morph and really
take root. When you start thinking about the principle behind the rules
you ask yourself new questions: What kind of reputation would this
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create for your organization in the eyes of the end consumer? What
would the end consumer say on the CFPB complaint hotline. Those
kinds of conversations are much more robust than they have been in the
past.
I also think you can tell the culture has shifted when the
compliance and risk teams have a veto in the reputational risk
committee. If you get one control partner that says, "No, I vote against.
I do not think this is a good idea," that sends everybody back to the
drawing board. Once the business understands that point of view, they
do not even bring these proposals forward. That means that now the
number of reputational risk committees may be fewer than previously
because the business has been enculturated with this concern for
reputational risk. That is when you start to see the cultural shift.
Broome: And from a regulatory perspective, how do the
regulators sitting up here today define reputational risk and how do you
measure it?
Clark: That is a huge question. It is hard to define; it is even
harder to measure. Reputational risk is very behavioral. For example,
since I was introduced as a former professional musician, lots of people
will probably think, "Tim Clark, he is that supervisor that used to be a
professional musician."
Neiman: A whole new perspective.
Clark: Just to be clear Richard, I am completely comfortable
that
reputation. But my point is that people form an opinion of
with
institutions just as they form an opinion of other people, and that
reputation is very important.
On the compliance side there is a huge role for reputational risk;
it is important to have the ability to impact decision making. I am
hearing others talk about creating the culture that makes for better
decision making. That goes beyond just compliance. It is at a much
higher level of the firm; that is where thinking about the importance of
reputation really matters.
I am less concerned with measuring reputation. I think firms
should be aware of their reputation, and if their reputation suffers, aware
of how that may impact their financial condition. We are living in a
period right now where public trust in the banking system is not at a
high point. To address that, institutions need to dedicate efforts to
providing good services for clients, good services for customers. They
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need to understand how participation in various markets can impact the
functioning of those markets. Most importantly around this there needs
to be a control framework that allows you to manage your reputation.
Belshaw: Once you have damaged your reputation in any way,
it is very, very hard to rebuild it. It is much easier going the other
direction. That has been clear since the financial crisis. With
institutions as well as with regulators we are working to get that good
reputation back.
For something telling, look at our supervision by risk
framework which was implemented many, many years ago. When we
designed that, we included reputation risk and I can remember people
saying to us at that time, "Why is that a concern of yours? Why is that
even your business?" I doubt that anyone would even think of asking
that question today since it is so critical to the soundness of an
institution.
I also harken back to a memory from long ago where a banker
once asked me, "What level of violation is acceptable?" And people
said to me in the meeting that my face spoke volumes. I said, "None.
You must shoot for none because inevitably there will be some
mistakes." And I doubt that question would be in anyone's mind today.
I do not mean to suggest that we have a zero tolerance for mistakes, but
clearly you do not plan to shoot for a certain level of non-compliance.
Kaplan: I would suggest to you that Tim Clark's and Sally
Belshaw's comments are significant because each noted that reputation
risk is inherently a safety and soundness consideration. It is risk to the
organization.
It also highlights the way different regulators have come to use
similar terms. When the CFPB talks about risk, we are talking about
risk to consumers. When the prudential regulators have spoken about
the various kinds of risk, they are talking about the risk to the
institution. Although we are using similar language, we do not mean
exactly the same things when we use those words.
From the CFPB's point of view, as a safety and soundness
consideration, we do not spend a lot of time concerned with reputational
risk. We think that is the province of the prudential regulators and the
institutions themselves. From our point of view, the best and easiest
way to safeguard your reputation in the marketplace is by doing what
we promote: treating customers fairly and making the products and
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services that they need to live twenty-first century lives available to
them at prices that they can afford to pay.
V. COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Neiman: There was some reference to the enforcement panel
earlier today where there was a lively discussion around how regulation
by enforcement seems to be the dominant approach to changing
behavior and assuring compliance at our largest financial institutions.
The panel pointed to increasing fines, with each fine being the floor for
the next fine.
This is in contrast with the more traditional prudential approach
when matters were initially identified and addressed in the examination
and supervisory process with non-public actions that were only
escalated depending on the level of severity or the degree of noncompliance. I actually heard from my former agency, now known as
the New York Department of Financial Services, that the earlier,
prudential approach did not work to change practice, so they moved to
try a different approach, much more enforcement oriented.
The question is how is this environment changing how firms
organize, how they staff compliance departments, how they establish
priorities? A lot of these issues are not arising from the examination
process. They are arising from the headlines; they are arising from
whistleblowers and other referrals. I think it would be interesting to
hear both the industry perspective and also the regulator's perspective.
Let us start with Paula Dominick.
Dominick: One important thing is to be ahead of potential
problems. This has required an explosion of monitoring and testing.
The biggest jump in our staffing has been around monitoring and testing
- more so testing than monitoring. We all do a certain amount of
monitoring in our routines, but the actual testing has brought a lot of
new work and a lot of new staff. Testing includes defining a testing
program, the scope, the script, the exceptions, , whether you do it
through technology, whether you do it through people - all those pieces
require new staff be brought on board.
We do something else that is important: every time there is a
large enforcement action, we actually dissect it to scrutinize our own
operations. For each major enforcement action, we look at all the
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components of it, look at every one of our practices, and do a compare
and contrast. Every time we start a new risk assessment and then run it
through the machine and actually look at whether or not we need any
kinds of compliance enhancements. That is normal for us now. If you
went back three, four, five, six, seven years ago, that would not have
been routine.
You have to make sure there are enough people in the
compliance function that can take an enforcement action apart with the
help of our legal partners. We do a lot of hand in hand work with our
legal department to look at enforcement actions. We need to make sure
that we understand what they mean; then we decide whether or not our
compliance system is up to that next rung, whether or not there are any
additional enhancements required. We have to answer the question of
whether or not our current system captures the risk that lead to the
enforcement action.
Neiman: And that testing, is that being done centrally by
business function, by legal entity, by ...
Dominick: That is the $64,000 Question. We have a little bit of
a hybrid. We have quality control and quality assurance that are each
required by the line of business. They are required to make sure that
their processes are compliant and sound with respect to operational risk.
Compliance does ongoing monitoring as well as spot testing
within the compliance function. Some of our testing is actually
centralized. We have a centralized consumer testing function; it covers
the mortgage piece, it covers all of the other consumer tests and it is a
good way to cross fertilize. We have that all centralized. The banking
and markets is essentially centralized as another testing unit. We have a
requirement that the businesses know their process and they do their
own testing and then we have a testing function as well from a
compliance perspective.
Neiman: So Carol, how do you organize compliance?
Hunley: Our organization is similar, but a bit of a smaller scale
than what Paula described. We have a centralized compliance testing
unit and we have significantly increased our compliance staff over the
past two years. But probably the biggest shift that we have at our
organization is not in compliance per say, but in the line of business.
The business line is building that quality assurance because I cannot
hire enough people to monitor and to test and to keep people from doing
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the wrong things. It has to be imbedded into the business and that is the
journey that we are on right now.
Dominick: Yes, that is absolutely correct. There are not enough
compliance people to test all of these things every minute of every day.
If the business does not have their operational process correct there is
not enough testing that Carol Hunley and I can do to catch everything
that happens. The business has to own their risk, just like they own
their credit risk and their market risk; they have to own their compliance
risk as well.
Hunley: The paradigm shift that we are talking about is very
costly. It has been a significant investment and I am not sure that we as
an industry have caught up with the size of that investment.
The other issue on the recent enforcement landscape is product
line abandonment. I think some of the big banks are saying, "You know
what? It is just not worth it. We will get out of this product, or that
product, or that product, and anything that smells like that product."
That is creating consumer harm in another way. Steve Kaplan talked
about the shadow banking system and I think there may be another
shadow banking system that pops up that offers all these products that
we are all getting out of.
Neiman: Some could possibly be delivered online and at lower
costs.
Dominick: On the innovation question, one of the tenants of the
CFPB is to make sure that we are all innovating around consumer
products. We had this conversation in with regulators. As compliance
executives, we are not going to let our institutions get even close to the
line. So as they try to innovate, we are trying to look where that line is
going to be and hold them far enough back from the line. I am not
suggesting that innovation has in any way stopped or halted, but there
is a lot more discussion around it because of the compliance risk.
Hunley: I was in an innovation seminar given by our parent
company. It was training and I was the one saying, "Cannot do that.
Nope, not in the U.S. Cannot do that."
Kaplan: I think that we are very sensitive to exactly the point
you are trying to raise. We understand that if our goal is to protect
consumers in the financial services marketplace that there are two
components to that; the first is to make sure that consumers are treated
fairly when they do business, and the second is to make sure that they
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have access to the products and services that they need at a cost that
they can afford. And we recognize the need to temper our goals around
the fairness piece with the possibility that too costly an approach could
result in consumers not having specific products available. We are very
conscious of that.
Having said that though, I would suggest to you that when I was
introduced to financial regulation in the Spring of 2007, the Dow was
about 14,000. By March of 2009 the Dow was about 6,500 - that was a
pretty costly thing also. What we are trying to do is balance what we
believe is the more temperate, more modest cost of getting the system
on a bit better footing against those dramatic, cataclysmic costs that we,
the people in this room, lived through just a few years ago.
Neiman: Tim Clark, Sally Belshaw, when we see these
extraordinary fines, I do not think the public appreciates the level of
resources, of systems, of people that have been dedicated to these
compliance areas. Can we get your perspective on that.?
Belshaw: We certainly appreciate that - I have seen the quantity
and quality of compliance and risk management staff increase
dramatically in our institutions. Some of this is, as Paula Dominick
described, a result of examining the public actions that have come out
on specific institutions and saying, "Can I meet that standard before I
am subject to it as well and bear the cost that will go with a fine?"
In one case in particular-I will not mention a name-but the
way we arrived at a specific fine related to what we believed the
institution was intentionally doing to cut costs associated with
compliance. We recognize compliance is costly, but you cannot afford
not to do it well if you are going to be in the business.
Right now, particularly with respect to BSA/AML 2 there is a lot
of dialog around the OCC telling institutions not to do business with
specific clients. That is absolutely not the case. But in our
examinations, we review specific client relationships, and if we
determine that a bank is not managing that relationship or that risk
appropriately, we point that out. The option is, de-risk or manage it
properly and that is always the choice of that institution, recognizing
there are business costs that go with doing that.
Clark: I agree with everything that Sally Belshaw just said and

2. Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering
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I am going to take a slightly different direction. I think we have all
recently learned the important consequences that can result from risk
management failures. Those consequences can be to an individual
institution or much, much broader than that.
I see supervision and enforcement as two parts of the same
thing. We have put in place incentives for firms to actually internalize
the costs that are necessary for them to meet the regulations and the
rules. They benefit from the ability to operate in that market space and
they have compliance costs that they need to pay. If a regulator cannot
get where it needs to go through supervision, enforcement follows.
Supervisors tended to try a bit softer approach in the past; they
learned some very hard lessons, and they understand now that
incentives can be strongly helped along by enforcement actions when
you cannot get things done in other ways. Enforcement actions are a
useful tool that we hope we do not have to get to. The firms, first and
foremost, are the first line of defense to stop problems from happening.
The supervisors working with the firm can also help if there is a
problem. But if we have not gotten there through those two things,
enforcement actions are a very good way to capture the imagination of
people about what might happen so that they will be incented to stop the
problem from occurring in the first place.
Neiman: The examination process has shifted and become more
forward thinking rather than being static in time. When you think about
examinations traditionally and you compare that to what we are doing
today, the new rules of stress testing, contingency planning, capital
planning; it is a much different focus. Eventually, I am sure that these
will be incorporated into our CAMEL (Capital, Assets, Management,
Earnings, Liquidity) and ROCA (Risk Management, Operational
Controls, Compliance, and Asset Quality) ratings under management
and possibly compliance.
Clark: We are pushing very hard on the capital and liquidity
side. I think it applies everywhere and it is a direct result of
understanding that you need to be thinking about how things can
manifest from activities you are engaged in and not just looking back at
how they did actually play back in reality.
Belshaw: I think we have seen very poignant examples of that
looking back to the foreclosure mess - FCM, that is what we call it.
Perhaps all of us should have seen that coming. We knew that the level
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of foreclosures was going to increase given the economic situation. We
knew that companies were going to do something to address a
skyrocketing volume that they were not prepared to handle.
To every compliance officer, if you examine your strategic plan,
focus in on anything that will be growing dramatically. That should be
a key showing you where you want to focus your attention; there is
great potential for that to get messed up. Using people who were
motivated to get a ton of volume done quickly, that should be a red flag
that there might be some reason to cut corners. Third-party outsourcing,
its dramatic increase, is an appropriate response for a business
addressing how they may cover something on a temporary basis or not
so temporary basis. But we have seen clearly you do not give up one
speck of the responsibility for how that party performs on your behalf
even though you are paying them to do it. Presuming that they have
some expertise - I think that is a very dangerous presumption.
Dominick: At board meetings and at audit committee meetings,
the question is asked, "Do you have enough people?" and "Do you have
the right people to accomplish what you need?" That question is asked
every quarter. There is a heightened awareness of the issue of
appropriate staffing. The conversation is not just about having enough
people, it is about having the right kind of people to execute the
compliance program. That is asked over and over again.
Hunley: Of course the challenge is where do we find them
because we are all looking for them.
VI. SENIOR MANAGEMENT AND BOARD ENGAGEMENT WITH
COMPLIANCE

Broome: Should we talk about senior management engagement
and board engagement with the compliance function? How does the
board engage and how does senior management engage in the
compliance function from your observations?
Neiman: Earlier this morning at the corporate governance
panel, Professor Joseph Grundfest of Stanford Law School
recommended having two types of directors: compliance directors and
operational directors. There would be a set number of directors
responsible on the board for compliance - an interesting proposal.
Broome: So Paula Dominick and Carol Hunley, what is your
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perspective?
Dominick: From our perspective there is already active
engagement with the board; there is lots of dialog. We report our
compliance risk to the audit committee. I sit on the enterprise risk
committee. Our governance channels through the audit committee.
In the audit committee, there is an equal amount of conversation
on compliance risk as there is on audit reports. So the volume of
compliance items that these boards have to actually handle is
significant. The scope, the complexity, the discussion on rules - there is
a question of how much detail you want to present to the board. You
cannot give them too much or they get lost in some of the detail. You
have to be able to have the board engage in a dialog. That includes
explaining why you are bringing an issue to the board. You also have to
give them the appropriate context so that when members of the board
are alone with the management team, board members can lean in if they
need to.
There has been a shift; I think the amount of compliance items
that are going up to the board has grown exponentially. There is a
robust dialog around other companies' enforcement actions.
Hunley: I have added a function just for reporting because we
report to every board and every board committee, if I am not mistaken.
We are reporting everywhere so everybody is talking about compliance.
Dominick: With respect to reporting, consider the challenge
presented at major firms. How do you find out what everybody is
doing, grab all of those transactions or all those exceptions to all those
policies and rules with 240,000 people and figure out how to synthesize
and summarize that into half an hour or forty minutes to present to a
committee?
We get asked by the OCC what framework we use to decide
whether or not to escalate an issue to the board. That decision process
has become less of an art and more of a science. But I think it has to be
a balance of both; you have to be able to articulate to your regulators
after the fact why you took the course of action that you did.
Kaplan: Earlier I was talking about the significance that the
CFPB places on CMS. One of the pillars of an effective compliance
management system is the appropriate level of involvement of both
senior management and boards.
We try not to be unduly prescriptive because we think there are
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a lot of ways that you can accomplish this goal. But at the same time
we think that some level of training and awareness of board members is
an appropriate thing. On some regular and consistent basis there should
be compliance reporting up to that level. It can be at the committee
structure or it can be at the full board structure. Sometimes most of the
reporting is done at a subsidiary board rather than at a parent board but
that will vary from circumstance to circumstance. But as a general
proposition we consider it to be critical for the board to be involved.
Back to the point that Carol Hunley was making earlier;
ultimately, the ability to execute against these responsibilities comes
down to resources. We are all challenged for resources but it is the
board that can make the decision about how to allocate those resources.
VII. HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS AND REGULATION
Neiman: I have a question for our regulators. We have heard
the term "heightened supervision" or "heightened expectations." From
the regulatory perspective, can you provide us with a clear
understanding of what heightened expectations are with respect to these
key functions?
Belshaw: Well I suspect that question is for me because the
OCC came up with heightened expectations. And it is hard to articulate
in a matter of minutes what that means; we have spent several years
trying to get clarity around it. It does not relate to just a level-one rating
within the CAMELS (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management,
Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk) rating system.
It relates to five specific areas where we have specified what we
think needs to improve. Articulation of risk appetite throughout the
organization is one; that goes from the board all the way through the
organization. We have talked about the sanctity of the charter because
the national bank charter is what matters to us. We have talked about
the increase in the quality of risk management and auditing. We
determined after the financial crisis that all of our mega-institutions
have "satisfactory" ratings in those categories. Across the entire
spectrum of an organization there may be pockets that were rated
differently, but as a whole each firm was rated as satisfactory.
But satisfactory was obviously not good enough to protect them
from financial harm. We have said that it has to be strong. Now we are
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looking at that trajectory, that plan for our organizations to achieve that
level of assessment. Some have already gotten there, but many more
still have a ways to go.
Clark: From our perspective, heightened expectations comes in
as part of the Dodd Frank Act. There are heightened expectations for

systemically important financial institutions and for the largest banks.
We take that very seriously and support it completely. What does that
mean for supervision? It means that we expect the largest, most
systemically important financial institutions to not simply meet the
minimum standard but be well above that minimum standard. We
expect them to have leading practices in key areas.
It also means that we are less patient in the past than we might
have been. If we find a firm does not have strong compliance practices,
we will do what we can to encourage firms to increase and strengthen
their practices in order to meet these stronger expectations.
Kaplan: I am not sure that we have been around long enough to
have heightened our expectations. We like to believe the fact that we
exist has heightened everyone else's expectations.
VIII. CFPB EXAMINATION AND CONSUMER COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION
Broome: Steve Kaplan, you did talk a little about the consumer
exam process and how it is focused on products more so than entities.
Is there anything else you want to add about that process? Then I want
to go to our other regulators and ask them that given that the CFPB is
there for the largest financial institutions, what role do your
organizations still play in the consumer compliance examination?
Kaplan: Just briefly, we have invented some vocabulary in our

short lives. We organize our supervisory activities around product lines
- we call them IPLs, institutional product lines. When we go into an

institution we could be looking at, say, mortgage origination. We might
be simultaneously looking at depositories and non-depositories that both
originate mortgages; we are making sure the standards are achieved
across the board when we look at one of these individual product lines.
We look at it in light of the transferred responsibilities that came
to us under Dodd Frank. That includes responsibilities for enforcing
against the largest banks and non-depositories compliance with things
like TILA, RESPA, TISA, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt
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Collection Act, ECOA, HMDA, UDAAP, etc.
We also enforce some things jointly with the FTC, areas for
which they are responsible for promulgating regulations, an example
being the telemarketing sales rule. Our jurisdiction on the depository
side is that we are the primary consumer compliance regulator for banks
with assets of at least ten billion dollars and members of the corporate
families of those institutions.
We go into these organizations most often to review a particular
product line but there are times when efficiency and economies of scale
suggest that we do a fairly broad number of IPLs simultaneously. At
times those are adequate to produce what we call full scope point in
time examination and result in a reported examination and a rating for
that institution.
For other institutions where we do not do full scope point in
time examinations, we issue supervisory letters that reflect our findings
on the individual products that we have looked at. In those institutions,
from time to time, we will create something called a rollup which is a
reported examination that takes into account all of the individual
product lines that we have looked at over a given period. That rollup
could be issued as frequently as every eighteen months and perhaps
maybe not for several years depending on the number of product lines
that we have looked at.
Broome: So Tim Clark and Sally Belshaw what do you still
look at?
Belshaw: Perhaps we should have asked Barney Frank, who
spoke this morning, why a few specific consumer regulations were left
with the OCC. We have a few left, but primarily we will rely to the
extent that we can, on the work that the CFPB is doing in our largest
institutions.
We do still have responsibility for a consumer compliance rating
and in our supervision by risk we still assess compliance risk
management. That rolls up into many of the things that we talked about
today with respect to overall risk management and management of the
institution. This continues to be a focus of ours although we are not
necessarily examining for all of the consumer regulations the way that
we used to. From a compliance standpoint we still have responsibility
for BSA/AML compliance. Also, the Community Reinvestment Act is
still our responsibility, so there are still plenty of things within the
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compliance domain that we have supervisory responsibility for.
Clark: I am not actually a part of the Division of Consumer
Compliance Affairs at the Federal Reserve so I do not want to go into
the list of things that Steve was weighing out because I am sure I would
get a few of them wrong. Obviously the Federal Reserve continues to
have a number of responsibilities associated with consumer compliance.
State member banks are one area, but there are a number of other areas.
Probably the more important point is that we work with the CFPB, we
learn from the CFPB and their work, and our responsibilities at the
holding company consolidated level are going to be informed by the
work that they do as we think about the overall firm wide compliance
program and its effectiveness.
Kaplan: And I think it is worth noting that there is a great deal
of emphasis in all our organizations on collaboration and cooperation
across these overlapping responsibilities. I happen to be the point
person at the CFPB for just that role. I talk regularly to your colleagues
about how we can better accomplish the ultimate goal of the various
government agencies by coordinating and sharing. In significant part,
this collaboration is meant to reduce the burden that all of our activities
represent for the institutions that we regulate.
Neiman: I think we have a few minutes for questions if there is
one from the audience.
Audience Member: The question came up at the prior panel
about the reporting line for the Chief Compliance Officer. Should it be
the CEO, the General Counsel, or another member of management?
Does anyone on the panel have any thoughts they can share?
Dominick: There are different designs.
Some of my
competitors report to the Chief Risk Officer. I happen to report to the
General Counsel and I've had conversations with both the Fed and OCC
on this point. I think as long as there is a stature in the organization, as
long as there is credible respect for the compliance function, and as long
as you have a risk approach, you are good. There is some concern with
reporting to the General Counsel that you just have a legal approach to
compliance. Compliance is a risk and as long as you have that riskreward dynamic in everything you analyze and look at, rather than a
strict legal interpretation I think it could work.
It depends on how the broader company is organized. You have
to make sure wherever you go there is stature. If you do not have that
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stature, then you do not have that credible challenge. If you do not have
that credible challenge, then you cannot affect the culture of compliance
within the organization. It really depends on making sure that wherever
compliance is, it has that stature.
Neiman: Earlier, Tom Baxter went over the various reporting
lines. There was no right one; they could all be acceptable including the
CRO, the CEO, the General Counsel, or general auditors.
Belshaw: I think that would include all of us. Exactly - well
said.
Neiman: I want to thank everybody. You can see from the
quality of the interaction both from the regulatory side as well as the
bankers side that we were very fortunate to have this panel join us
today. Please join me in thanking them.

